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Abstract In this study, we compared the everyday meanings
of conditionals (“if p then q”) and universally quantified
statements (“all p are q”) when applied to sets of elements.
The interpretation of conditionals was predicted to be directly
related to the conditional probability, such thatP(“if p then q”)
= P(q|p). Quantified statements were assumed to have two
interpretations. According to an instance-focused interpreta-
tion, quantified statements are equivalent to conditionals, such
that P(“all p are q”) = P(q|p). According to a set-focused
interpretation, “all p are q” is true if and only if every instance
in set p is an instance of q, so that the statement would be
accepted when P(q|p) = 1 and rejected when this probability
was below 1. We predicted an instance-focused interpretation
of “all”when the relation between p and q expressed a general
law for an infinite set of elements. A set-focused interpretation
of “all” was predicted when the relation between p and q
expressed a coincidence among the elements of a finite set.
Participants were given short context stories providing infor-
mation about the frequency of co-occurrence of cases of p, q,
not-p, and not-q in a population. They were then asked to
estimate the probability that a statement (conditional or
quantified) would be true for a random sample taken
from that population. The probability estimates for con-
ditionals were in accordance with an instance-focused
interpretation, whereas the estimates for quantified state-
ments showed features of a set-focused interpretation.
The type of the relation between p and q had no effect on this
outcome.
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Given the knowledge that if an animal is a dog, then it barks,
does this imply that all dogs bark? There seems to be a close
relationship between the meanings of the two assertions, but
which relationship exactly? This question is relevant because
the meaning that people ascribe to such statements determines
the conditions under which they take the statements to be true,
and hence the inferences that they are willing to draw from
them. The first statement is an instance of a conditional (i.e.,
an “if–then” structure), the second an instance of an affirma-
tive universally quantified statement (i.e., a structure of the
form “all x are y”). The aim of the present work was to
investigate whether people understand parallel statements
with “if” and with “all” in the same way.
The truth-functional approach to conditionals
Two main frameworks that have been employed in reasoning
research to model people’s interpretations of these statements
are classical logic and probability theory. In classical logic,
“if” is equivalent to “all” when applied to sets of elements:
Both would be formalized in the same way. In the example
above, they would be represented as ∀x(Dx→ Bx), which is
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read “for all variables x it holds that if x is a dog (D), then x
barks (B).” As in classical logic in general, statements of this
form have binary truth values (i.e., they are either true or false,
with no values in between), and they are truth-functional (i.e.,
their truth or falsity as a composite statement is a function of
the truth or falsity of their constituent propositions). The
conditional at the core of the statement shares these properties
and is called the material conditional. The truth or falsity of
the material conditional, as determined by each combination
of the truth or falsity of its constituent propositions, is de-
scribed in a truth table, shown in the first column of Table 1.
Here the conditional is stated as “if p then q,” and its constit-
uent propositions p and q stand for statements such as “x is a
dog” or “x barks.” The table shows that the material condi-
tional is true when both p and q are true, false when p is true
but q is false, and true in the two cases in which p is false.
According to the theory of mental models, people’s core
interpretation of conditionals correspond to the material con-
ditional (Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 2004; Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 2002). Mental-model theory proposes that people rea-
son by building mental representations of the logical possibil-
ities established by the premises (where each truth table case
corresponds to one truth table case), and then judging whether
any possibilities were shared by every premise, which could
then be formulated as a conclusion. The representation of the
conditional “if p then q” is based on the three models:
p q
:p q
:p :q
(where ¬ stands for “not”). These models correspond to the
truth table cases in which the material conditional is true. The
truth table case “p ¬q” is not included as a model because it
stands for a state of affairs in which the material conditional is
false, and the theory assumes that only cases in which a
statement is true are represented.
A further assumption in the mental-model theory is that due
to limitations in working memory capacity, people start by
building only one or two alternative models of the premises
and check whether they can draw an initial conclusion from
them. People may then flesh out further models in order to
search for counterexamples to the initial conclusion. The
indicative conditional is proposed to have the model of the
conjunction “p and q” (shown in the first row of its truth table)
as its initial model.1
The probabilistic approach to conditionals
There is converging empirical evidence that people’s every-
day interpretation of the conditional is not truth-functional, but
probabilistic. People’s degree of belief in conditional state-
ments does not map onto probabilities of the models that make
the material conditional true, as would be predicted bymental-
models theory (Girotto & Johnson-Laird, 2004; Johnson-
Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, & Caverni, 1999).
Rather, people’s degree of belief in the conditional can be
better described as their subjective conditional probability of
the consequent q given the antecedent p: P(if p then q) =
P(q|p) (Douven & Verbrugge, 2010; Edgington, 1991; Evans,
Handley, Neilens, & Over, 2007; Evans, Handley, & Over,
2003; Fugard, Pfeifer, Mayerhofer, & Kleiter, 2011; Oberauer,
Geiger, Fischer, & Weidenfeld, 2007; Oberauer & Wilhelm,
2003). The equivalence of the probability of the conditional
with the conditional probability, P(if p then q) = P(q|p),
is often called the Equation (Edgington, 1995) and
forms a central part of the probabilistic paradigm in
the psychology of reasoning. The conditional referred
to in the Equation is called the probability conditional
(Adams, 1998) or the conditional event (de Finetti,
1936/1995). A truth table for the conditional event in
line with the proposal of de Finetti is shown in the
second column of Table 1. Here the truth or falsity of
the conditional is uncertain when the antecedent p is
false (de Finetti actually proposed an extended version of
Table 1, in which not only the conditional, but also its
constituents p and q could be true, false, or uncertain, cf.
Baratgin, Over, & Politzer, 2013, 2014).
One piece of evidence for the conditional-event interpreta-
tion of conditionals is that it avoids the “paradoxes of the
material conditional.” These refer to two inferences that are
valid for the material conditional but that people seldom draw
(Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2011): (1) “Given q, it follows that ‘if p
then q’” and (2) “Given ¬p, it follows that ‘if p then q’.” For
example, suppose that it is raining and you do not want to go
outside because, having no raincoat or umbrella, you think it
very unlikely that you would stay dry. According to the
1 Although the material conditional interpretation of the conditional, like
the conjunctive interpretation, is truth-functional because it is defined as
being true or false as a function of the truth or falsity of its constituent
propositions, the process of model construction by which people arrive at
such truth-functional representations is itself not truth-functional. For
example, information about temporal order or causality could affect
whether the model corresponding to the first row of the truth table for
the conditional is represented as “p q” or as “q p.”
Table 1 Truth tables for the material conditional and for the conditional
event
Classical truth table
for the material
conditional
De Finetti truth
table for the
conditional event
Jeffrey truth
table for the
conditional event
p q T T T
p ¬q F F F
¬p q T U P(q|p)
¬p ¬q T U P(q|p)
T stands for “true,” F for “false,” U for “uncertain,” and ¬ for “not”
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second paradox, the more confident you are that you will not
go out in the rain (¬p), the more confident you should be that if
you do go out, you will stay dry (if p then q). But then how can
it be reasonable not to go out in the rain? This example shows
that interpreting the conditional as a material conditional leads
to absurd implications when applied to everyday contexts in
which we use conditionals (Elqayam & Over, 2013; Pfeifer,
2013b).
Further evidence for a conditional event interpretation of
conditionals comes from the truth table task. In the classical
version of this task, people are asked to judge, for each truth-
table case, whether the case renders the conditional true,
renders it false, or is irrelevant for the truth or falsity of the
conditional. People mostly classify the two false-antecedent
cases (¬p q and ¬p ¬q) as irrelevant for the truth of the
conditional (Johnson-Laird & Tagart, 1969), in line with the
de Finetti truth table for the conditional event (Baratgin et al.,
2013, 2014; de Finetti, 1936/1995). In a probabilistic version
of the truth-table task, people are given explicit information on
the frequency of occurrence of each of the four cases of the
truth table in a population and are asked to estimate the
probability of the conditional on this basis. Here it is found
that the majority of people’s answers are in accordance with
the conditional probability P(q|p), whereas a minority give
answers in accordance with the conjunction “p and q” (Evans
et al., 2007; Evans et al., 2003; Oberauer et al., 2007;
Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). When given the opportunity to
perform this task repeatedly, people initially endorsing a con-
junctive interpretation tend to shift toward a conditional-event
interpretation in the course of the experiment (Fugard et al.,
2011; Pfeifer, 2013a). The conditional-event interpretation
also seems to become more frequent with children’s age
(Barrouillet, Gauffroy, & Lecas, 2008) and to be endorsed
more frequently by adults with higher cognitive ability (Evans
et al., 2007).
How is the probability of the conditional, understood as the
conditional probability, computed psychologically? The prob-
abilistic paradigm proposes that people compute the condi-
tional probability by performing a Ramsey test, which de-
scribes a process of hypothetical thinking, or a mental simu-
lation, in which people suppose p to be the case, make what-
ever changes to their beliefs are necessary to preserve consis-
tency, and then estimate the probability of q on the basis of this
supposition (Baratgin et al., 2014; Evans & Over, 2004;
Ramsey, 1929/1990; Stalnaker, 1968).
Because the outcome of the Ramsey test is independent of
whether p is in fact true, it can be used not only in the context
of indicative conditionals (for which the antecedent could be
true or false), but also in the context of counterfactuals, whose
antecedent is known to be false and which express what would
have been the case had the antecedent been true (e.g., “If you
had left 5 min earlier, you would have caught the train”). The
possibility of specifying that when the antecedent is false, the
conditional event is not just uncertain, but can still have
different subjective degrees of belief, determined by the
Ramsey test, is captured in the Jeffrey truth table (Baratgin
et al., 2013; Edgington, 1995; Jeffrey, 1991). The Jeffrey truth
table is shown in the third column of Table 1.
The interpretation of quantified statements
The mounting evidence for a probabilistic interpretation of
conditionals in terms of the conditional event poses the ques-
tion of whether universally quantified statements of the form
“All elements of p have feature q” are also probabilistic and
non-truth-functional, and whether they can also be described
through the Equation, in this case adapted to state P(“all p are
q”) = P(q|p).
How do different theories predict “all” to be interpreted?
As for conditionals, both the truth-functional (Johnson-Laird
& Byrne, 2002) and probabilistic (Chater & Oaksford, 1999;
Pfeifer, 2006) paradigms have made predictions for quantified
statements. The theory of mental models proposes that people
endorse a material-conditional interpretation of “all,” because
the proposed initial and fleshed out models for universally
quantified statements coincide exactly with those of the ma-
terial conditional. The difference is that for quantified state-
ments, each model can be represented multiple times to indi-
cate multiple instances of a set, and that a “mental footnote”
can be added to a model to indicate that an element of the
model has been exhaustively represented (Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991, 2002). Thus, a fully fleshed out representation of
“all p are q” (with an arbitrary number of instances for each
model) would be:
p q
p q
:p q
:p q
:p :q
:p :q
One can see that these are the same models as those of the
material conditional from Table 1, but that each truth-table
case is represented multiple times.
In the probabilistic framework, the interpretation of “all,”
like the interpretation of “if,” has been assumed to be related
to the conditional probability P(q|p). However, the endorse-
ment of “all” is not assumed to be a direct function of this
conditional probability. That is, it is not assumed that the
Equation P(if p then q) = P(q|p) holds for “all.” Instead, it is
proposed that a statement “all p are q” is endorsedwhenP(q|p)
= 1, and rejected when this probability is below 1 (Chater &
Oaksford, 1999; Pfeifer, 2006). A conditional probability of 1
is a limiting case within the probabilistic approach to
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reasoning. An interpretation of “all” in terms of P(q|p) = 1 is
neither truth-functional nor binary, because the truth of the
statement remains undetermined when the antecedent p is
false. Thus, according to this interpretation, an encounter with
a cat does not provide any information about the truth of “All
animals that are dogs bark.”
Whereas findings on the interpretation of “if” are converg-
ing toward the conditional event, few studies have explicitly
investigated the interpretation of “all.” Oberauer and Wilhelm
(2003) analyzed both statement types with the probabilistic
truth-table task described above and found that the interpreta-
tions of both statement types depended on P(q|p) for the
majority of participants, and on P(p and q) for a minority.
The conjunctive interpretation was not endorsed more often
for quantified statements than for conditionals, so that
inasmuch as those findings speak against a material-
conditional interpretation of conditionals, they do so also for
quantified statements.
Experiment
In the present study, we aimed to build on the results above to
further investigate the relation between the meanings of “if”
and “all” statements that were equated as much as possible in
all regards except for the type of expression. Because “all”
always refers to a set of elements, we used conditionals that
also referred to a set. In this way we aimed to make both
statement types more directly comparable. Conditionals that
refer to sets, such as “if an animal is a dog, then it barks,” are
called general conditionals, in opposition to singular
conditionals, which refer to individual instances of a set, such
as “if this animal is a dog, then it barks.” Previous research on
conditionals has focused mainly on singular conditionals (cf.
Evans & Over, 2004). Thus, the empirical support of
the Equation P(“if p then q”) = P(q|p) has come mostly
from singular conditionals. We hypothesized that the
Equation would hold also for general conditionals, such
that conditionals referring to sets are interpreted as the
conditional event. Unless otherwise specified, we will refer to
general conditionals when we speak of conditionals in this
article.
The conditional probability P(q|p) describes the proportion
of p cases in a set for which q holds, and this proportion stays
constant whether the statement refers to the entire set or to a
random sample drawn from it. Thus, if P(q|p) = .8 for an entire
set or population, then P(q|p) is also .8 for a random sample of
size 10, or of size 100, or of any other number, because the
expected proportion of exceptions in the sample remains
constant across sample sizes. We therefore predicted that
when people estimated the probability of the conditional, their
estimates would not vary with the size of the sample that the
conditional referred to.
The conditional “if p then q” is a claim about instances of
the set p: For every case of p in the set, it is said that q is the
case. A statement “all p are q” can be interpreted in the same
way, and then it would be equivalent to the conditional.
Alternatively, “all p are q” can be interpreted as a statement
about the entire set of instances of p. We will refer to the first
interpretation as instance-focused, and to the second as set-
focused. According to the instance-focused interpretation, “all
p are q” is confirmed every time an instance of p co-occurs
with an instance of q, and is disconfirmed every time an
instance of p occurs for which q is not the case. The proba-
bility of “all p are q” is therefore P(q|p). According to the set-
focused interpretation, “all p are q” is true if and only if every
element in the set p is an element of set q. The probability of
“all p are q” is therefore the probability that there is no
exception—that is, no case of p and not q—in the entire set.
The subjective probability of an instance-focused interpre-
tation of “all” is independent of sample size, just as is the
probability of the conditional. In contrast, an effect of sample
size is predicted from the set-focused interpretation of “all.”
According to this interpretation, a statement that refers to an
entire set or population (e.g., “All the squirrels ate from the
pack of pistachios,” referring to ten squirrels held in a cage) is
false whenever the population contains an exception—that is,
P(q|p) < 1 (e.g., if only eight of the ten squirrels actually ate
from the pistachios). However, if the statement refers to a
subset or sample, then it can be that although the population
includes exceptions, the sample happened to contain none, so
that for the sample, the statement would be true (e.g., when
you take four squirrels out of the cage, all of which ate from
the pistachios, then the sentence is true for this sample of four,
even though it is false for the population of ten). The proba-
bility that the statement holds for the sample is the probability
that the sample contains no exceptions. For a sample of size 1,
this probability equals the proportion of exceptions in the
population: P(q|p). For any given P(q|p) < 1, the probability
that the sample contains no exceptions decreases with increas-
ing sample size. Mathematically, the decrement is exponen-
tial: P(“all p are q”) = P(q|p)n.
We predicted that an instance-focused interpretation of “all
p are q” would occur when the statement expressed a lawful
relationship that held for an infinite number of elements (e.g.,
“All squirrels eat pistachios”). When the elements of a set
have a general, lawful relationship, this relationship can be
expected to express itself in a random sample from that set as a
constant proportion of p cases that are q cases, independently
of the size of the sample. A set-focused interpretation of “all p
are q” was predicted to occur when the statement referred to a
coincidental relation holding for a limited number of elements
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(e.g., “All the squirrels in the cage ate from the pack of
pistachios”). We therefore predicted that people’s estimates
of the probability of “all p are q” for a sample would decrease
with increasing sample size when the relationship between p
and q expressed a coincidence, but not when it expressed a
general law.
Method
Participants A total of 122 students of the University of
Marburg took part in the experiment in exchange for €6.
Their mean age was 23 years (range = 18–33). They studied
different majors, and eight reported previous experience in
formal logic. Excluding these eight participants from the
analysis did not change the pattern of results. The analyses
are therefore reported using the entire sample.
Design Participants performed a probabilistic truth-table task
in which they evaluated the probability of a given
statement in light of explicit information on the frequen-
cy of each truth-table case. Each statement referred to a
feature of plants of a fictitious species. Participants were
asked to estimate, on a scale from 0 to 100, the probability that
the statement was true for a random sample of instances
of the species.
The participants were randomly assigned to one of two
groups. One group evaluated conditionals, and the other eval-
uated quantified statements. Across 20 trials, each participant
gave probability estimates for statements referring to five
sample sizes (1, 20, 40, 60, and 80). The context story on
the plant species was used to manipulate the type of relation
that the statement was meant to refer to: Half of the statements
expressed a general law holding for the entire population of
the species, whereas the other half expressed a coinci-
dental relation happening to hold for a set of 100
instances. Furthermore, the truth-table frequencies
reflected values of P(q|p) = .96 for half of the state-
ments, and of P(q|p) = .76 for the other half. This
resulted in a 2 (sentence type) × 5 (sample size) × 2 (relation
type) × 2 [P(q|p)] mixed-model design with the first variable
as a between-subjects factor and the other three as within-
subject factors.
Within each group evaluating one of the two statement
types, experimental booklets were constructed as follows.
Sample size was varied randomly with two constraints: A
sample size did not repeat itself on two consecutive trials,
and each sample size occurred twice every ten trials. Relation
type was varied in a blocked way, such that one relation was
used for the first ten trials and the other relation for the second
ten trials. Which value of relation type occurred first was
counterbalanced between participants. Across every ten trials,
each sample size was associated once with one value of P(q|p)
and once with the other. The order of assignment of values of
P(q|p) to values of sample size was alternated from one value
of sample size to the next [e.g., if within a block of ten trials,
the first occurrence of n = 1 was assigned P(q|p) = .76 and the
second was assigned P(q|p) = .96, then the first occurrence of
n = 20 in that block was assigned P(q|p) = .96 and the second
P(q|p) = .76], from the first ten trials to the next ten trials [e.g.,
if the first assignment in Block 1 was of P(q|p) = .76, then the
first assignment in Block 2 was of P(q|p) = .96], and between
participants. Each statement was embedded in one of 20
context stories, whose order of occurrence varied randomly
for each participant.
With the exception of a change in statement type, the
booklets for conditionals were identical to those for quantified
statements.
Material The context stories of the statements all shared a
common scenario, describing a gardener and artist living in a
botanical garden. This context was chosen because the state-
ments were either about genetic properties of the plants or
about actions performed on them for artistic or gardening
purposes, reflecting relations holding as a general law or as a
coincidence, respectively.
Each story had one version referring to a general law and
one referring to a coincidental relation. Below is an example
of a trial, first in the version with a lawful relation type, then in
the version in which the relation type was coincidental. In both
versions, the sentence type is “all,” the sample size is 60, and
P(q|p) is .96.
One of the tree species of the botanical garden is the
Birnei. There exist two genetic variants of Birnei: A and
B. Further, Birnei are characterized by the fact that some
have a plain white bark and others a bark with black
lines. For each 100 elements of the species, the follow-
ing general relation holds:
& 48 are of variant A and have a bark with black lines
& 2 are of variant A and have a plain white bark
& 25 are of variant B and have a bark with black lines
& 25 are of variant B and have a plain white bark
Two visitors of the botanical garden meet at the Café
and talk about what they have seen. One of them says he
went past the Birnei and randomly made photos of 60 of
them. The other comments (without having seen the
photos):
“All the Birnei that are from A have a bark with black
lines”
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For the 60 Birnei in the photos, how probable is it that
this statement is true?
One of the tree species of the botanical garden is the
Birnei. There exist 100 Birnei in the botanical garden.
Some of them were planted in an area 1 at the mountain
side of the foot path, others were planted in an area 2 at
the valley side of the foot path. Normally Birnei have a
plain white bark, but in the context of an artistic project
Mr. Benyon painted black lines with charcoal on some
of them. This led to the following state of affairs:
& 48 lie in area 1 and have a bark with black lines
& 2 lie in area 1 and have a plain white bark
& 25 lie in area 2 and have a bark with black lines
& 25 lie in area 2 and have a plain white bark
At this time two visitors of the botanical garden meet at
the café and talk about what they have seen. One of
them says he passed by the Birnei and randomly took
photos of 60 of them. The other commented (without
having seen the photos):
“All the Birnei that are from 1 have a bark with black
lines”
For the 60 Birnei in the photos, how probable is it that
this statement is true?
Thus, lawful relations across all stories referred to general
features of plant species, and coincidental relations referred to
consequences of arbitrary actions performed on a certain
number of exemplars of a species growing in the garden at
that time. See the Appendix for a summary of all of the context
stories used.
People responded by entering a number between 0 and 100
in a frame. Above each frame stood the information
“0 = probability of 0%: it is certain that the statement is false”,
“100 = probability of 100%: it is certain that the statement is
true.”
Procedure Participants took part individually or in small
groups of up to six participants. They were seated in a quiet
testing room and were told that they would be presented with
short stories, in each of which a protagonist made a statement.
Their task was to assume that the information provided in the
story was true, and to infer what followed for the probability
that the statement was true. They were told that even though
all the information in the stories was true, this did not imply
that it was all relevant. They were informed that there was no
single answer as to which and how many pieces of informa-
tion were relevant; what interested the experimenters was
what was relevant for the participant. At the end of the
instructions were a description of the overall story scenario
and a sample trial. In the test booklet, each trial was printed on
a separate page, and a final page asked for demographic
information. The entire experimental session lasted
about 50 min.
Results
Participants’ probability estimates for “if” and “all” statements
were analyzed through an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
involving the between-subjects variable statement type and
the within-subjects variables sample size, relation type, and
P(q|p). Sample size was coded by a linear and a quadratic
contrast because our hypothesis concerned a monotonic and
potentially decelerating decrease in probability estimates as a
function of sample size. Means and standard errors of proba-
bility estimates for the conditional and quantified statements at
each value of sample size are reported in Table 2. The results
are depicted in Fig. 1.
The main effect of the linear contrast for sample size just
failed to reach significance, F(1, 113) = 3.72, p = .056, partial
eta-squared (ηp
2) = .032: Probability estimates tended to
decrease with increasing sample size. The quadratic contrast
for sample size was significant, F(1, 113) = 7.66, p = .007,
ηp
2 = .063: We observed a decrement followed by an incre-
ment of participants’ probability estimates with increasing
sample size. These overall trends were qualified by an inter-
action of the linear contrast of sample size with statement type,
F(1, 113) = 4.12, p = .045, ηp
2 = .035: The rate at which
probability estimates decreased with increasing sample size
was larger for quantified statements than for conditionals. The
interaction of the quadratic contrast of sample size with state-
ment type was not significant, F(1, 113) = .46, p = .50,
ηp
2 = .004. The quadratic contrast of sample size did interact
with P(q|p), F(1, 113) = 4.09, p = .046, ηp
2 = .035. This
interaction indicated that the U-shaped trend of estimates over
sample size was less pronounced when P(q|p) was .96 than
when it was .76. No other effects involving any polynomial
contrast of sample size were significant (largest F = 3.1,
smallest p = .08, for the interaction of the fourth-order contrast
with relation type). Finally, the main effect of P(q|p) was
significant, F(1, 113) = 229.32, p < .001, ηp
2 = .67:
Participants’ probability estimates were lower when the con-
ditional probability was .76 than when it was .96.
The interaction between sample size and statement type
suggests that probability estimates decreased with increasing
sample size for quantified statements, but not for conditionals.
Separate ANOVAs for each statement type showed that
this was indeed the case: The analysis for conditionals yielded
no significant linear contrast for the effect of sample size, F(1,
57) = .005, p = .95, ηp
2 < .0005. The quadratic contrast
for sample size was significant, F(1, 57) = 6.80, p = .012,
ηp
2 = .107, reflecting a U-shaped trend of probability estimates
over increasing sample size. No other contrasts involving sam-
ple size were significant (largest F = 2.62, smallest p = .11, for a
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cubic contrast for the effect of sample size). In addition, the
main effect of P(q|p) was significant, F(1, 57) = 109.57, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .66. For universally quantified statements, the linear
contrast for the effect of sample size was significant, F(1, 56) =
8.98, p = .004, ηp
2 = .138, but the quadratic contrast was not,
F(1, 56) = 1.93, p = .17, ηp
2 = .033, reflecting a roughly linear
decline of probability estimates with increasing sample size. No
other effects involving sample size were significant (largest F =
3.68, smallest p = .06, for the interaction of the fourth-order
contrast with relation type). Finally, the effect of P(q|p) was
significant, F(1, 56) = 119.93, p < .001, ηp
2 = .68.
Discussion
In this experiment, we compared the meanings of “if” and
“all” when applied to sets of elements. We hypothesized that
the interpretation of “if” would invariably be in accordance
with the conditional event, such that the probability of “if p
then q” would equal the conditional probability P(q|p). We
characterized this interpretation as being instance-focused
because the probability of the conditional reflects the proba-
bility that q is true for any instance of p. In contrast, we
assumed that “all” could be interpreted in two ways: one
equivalent to that of conditionals, which could be applicable
when the type of relation expressed was a general law holding
for an infinite number of elements; and the other set-focused,
which could be applicable when the type of relation expressed
was a coincidence happening to hold for a limited number of
elements.
Participants’ probability estimates for conditionals were in
line with an instance-focused interpretation: The estimates
increased with higher P(q|p) but did not decline with increas-
ing sample size. In contrast, probability estimates for quanti-
fied statements showed features of a set-focused interpreta-
tion: These estimates decreased with increasing sample size,
as predicted from the assumption that P(“all p are q”) declines
as the probability of an exception in a sample increases.
Contrary to our expectation, the difference in the interpreta-
tions of the two statements was independent of whether the
relation that they expressed was lawful or coincidental.
Finally, probability estimates were higher when P(q|p) was
.96 than when it was .76. This was expected both from an
instance-focused and from a set-focused interpretation, and
indicates that participants extracted the conditional probability
information from the truth-table frequencies and took it into
account in their judgments.
From a strict set-focused interpretation of universally quan-
tified statements, one would have expected probability esti-
mates to decrease exponentially with increasing sample size,
rapidly approaching zero, especially when P(q|p) was low. For
instance, P(“all p are q”) = .9620 = .44 in the condition with the
higher P(q|p) and the smallest sample size. In the condition
with the lower value of P(q|p), the probability of observing no
exception with a sample size of 20 is only .7620 = .004. In
contrast, people’s ratings ofP(“all p are q”) declined in a much
more shallow manner than is normatively demanded accord-
ing to a set-focused interpretation. One reason for the relative-
ly shallow decline is that the set-focused interpretation of “all”
was used only by a subset of participants, or only on a subset
of trials: If the interpretation of “all” is ambiguous, we should
Table 2 Means and standard deviations for probability estimates of “if”
and “all,” separately for sample size and P(q|p)
Statement type Sample Size P(q|p) M (SD)
If 1 .76 61.43 (23.31)
.96 75.07 (29.89)
20 .76 53.45 (26.45)
.96 71.61 (27.59)
40 .76 56.93 (26.54)
.96 70.47 (29.58)
60 .76 57.38 (27.02)
.96 73.74 (30.47)
80 .76 60.90 (28.52)
.96 74.31 (33.47)
All 1 .76 53.30 (25.06)
.96 67.05 (30.97)
20 .76 46.52 (27.06)
.96 63.14 (31.21)
40 .76 43.23 (25.83)
.96 59.48 (29.90)
60 .76 39.74 (25.18)
.96 57.24 (30.87)
80 .76 40.89 (28.01)
.96 54.40 (31.40)
Fig. 1 Mean probability estimates for conditional (if) and quantified (all)
statements in Experiment 1, as a function of the size of the sample that the
statements refer to, (a) for P(q|p) = .76, and (b) for P(q|p) = .96. The data
are collapsed across types of relation expressed in the statement (lawful
vs. coincidental). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals
Mem Cogn (2014) 42:1345–1356 1351
expect variability in its interpretation between and within
individuals.
Replications
The pattern of results above was replicated in a second exper-
iment (N = 120), using different materials and a slightly
different design. Participants were again given a probabilistic
truth-table task, in which the frequency information provided
made clear that there were always exceptions to the statement
in the population. We investigated the effects of statement
type (if, all), P(q|p) (.9, .6), and sample size (1, 2, 3, 5, 10,
100, and an entire population of infinite size). Statement Type
was a between-subjects factor, and the other variables were
within-subject factors. The results are depicted in Fig. 2. We
found that estimates for the probability of conditionals
remained in line with P(q|p) independently of sample size,
as is expected from an instance-focused interpretation. In
contrast, estimates for quantified statements declined with
increasing sample size, reaching their lowest values for a
sample of 100 elements. Estimates for “all” referring to the
entire population were comparable to those for samples of
100. The monotonic effect of set size was in line with a set-
based interpretation of “all.” However, the probability esti-
mates for “all” referring to the entire population still showed
an effect of P(q|p), and still were well above zero. In contrast,
a strict set-focused interpretation would imply that, given
P(q|p) < 1, the probability of a universal to hold in an infinite
population would be exactly zero. Taken together, answers to
quantified statements in both experiments showed a decline
with increasing sample size, as predicted from a set-focused
interpretation, yet that decline was much less pronounced than
would be expected mathematically from an endorsement of
this interpretation.
The small quadratic contrast for sample size found for
conditionals was not replicated in the second experiment.
That effect was also unexpected, in light of previous findings
for conditionals, and it is not predicted by any theory in the
field. We therefore do not consider it further.
When we varied statement type within subjects in a third
experiment (n = 48), we did not observe an effect of sample
size selectively for quantified statements. Participants were
asked to estimate the probability that a statement was true for a
sample that was either small (3, 4, 5, or 6) or large (30, 40, 50,
or 60), given a value of P(q|p) of .9 in the population. Here
small effects of sample size were found for both “if” and “all.”
From the distributions of the differences between ratings for
small and large sample sizes (see Fig. 3), one can see that for
both statement types, the majority of ratings showed no effect
of sample size, whereas a minority of ratings was lower when
sample size was large. The distributions show signs of bimo-
dality, suggesting that participants switched between the
instance-focused and set-focused interpretations for both “if”
statements and “all” statements. However, we found no cor-
relation between the ratings for “if” and for “all,” indicating
that it was not feasible to divide the participant sample into
two groups on the basis of whether or not they showed an
effect of sample size. Rather, participants seem to have taken
sample size into account on some trials and not on others, with
no meaningful relation between the type of statement (condi-
tional or quantified) and whether or not they took sample size
into account. It may be that when statement type is varied
within subjects, it becomes difficult to build distinct represen-
tations of the two statement types and to switch between them
consistently from one trial to the next.
General discussion
An instance-focused interpretation of conditionals referring to
sets of elements is in line with previous findings focusing on
single elements (Evans et al., 2003) or samples of a fixed size
(Oberauer & Wilhelm, 2003). For universally quantified state-
ments, the pattern of answers suggests that at least some par-
ticipants, on some trials, understand “all p are q” in a set-
focused way, as shown by their sensitivity to sample size.
However, people apparently fail to grasp the exponential form
by which the probability of the statement declines with sample
size, and instead make estimates that decline approximately
linearly with sample size. This observation could be an instance
of people’s tendency to combine probabilities additively rather
than multiplicatively (Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009).
An explanation of why people interpret conditionals in an
instance-focused way in line with the conditional event, such
that the probability of the conditional equals P(q|p), but are
Fig. 2 Mean probability estimates in Experiment 2. (a) Estimates for a
sample as a function of sample size and statement type (if, all), collapsed
across values of P(q|p). (b) Estimates for the population as a function of
statement type (if, all) and P(q|p) (.9, .6). Error bars show 95% confidence
intervals
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more inclined to interpret quantified statements in a set-
focused manner, could be as follows. The referent of a condi-
tional is always a single instance, even when the conditional is
general, such as “If an animal is a dog then it barks”: The
antecedent and consequent refer to an animal in the singular,
and that animal stands for the entire set or population of
animals, so that we could replace “an animal” by “any ran-
domly selected animal from the population”without distorting
the statement’s meaning. The conditional, however, does not
express information about a set, but about what to expect for
any instance from that set. A high degree of belief in a
conditional “if p then q” justifies a high degree of confidence
that any instance of p is an instance for which q holds. For
example, the conditional “If an animal is a dog, then it barks”
tells people that any time they encounter an animal that is a
dog, it is a barking animal. Conversely, the degree of belief in
“if p then q” should reflect the proportion of instances of p for
which q actually holds: A person’s degree of belief in “If an
animal is a dog, then it barks” reflects that person’s expecta-
tion that an animal barks, given that it is a dog, which is the
person’s subjective P(barks|dog).
Quantified statements, in contrast, are only defined for
entire sets: They do not make sense for an individual instance.
Therefore, quantified statements are interpreted as stating
something about the set as a whole. Hence, the elements of
the set have to be considered together in order to evaluate a
quantified statement. Assuming that a nonempty set of ele-
ments p exists, the statement “all p are q” either holds for the
set or it does not. The condition for it to hold is determined by
the type of quantifier involved. Taking the quantifier “all” to
mean P(q|p) = 1, the quantified statement holds if and only if
every single p element in the set is a q element. When “all p
are q” refers to a finite sample from a population, and it is
known that exceptions exist in the population, this interpreta-
tion leads to an effect of sample size: the larger the sample, the
higher the probability that it contains at least one of the
exceptions. The generality of this idea could be tested by
comparing conditionals expressed in the singular, as we used
in this experiment (e.g., “If a fruit is a lime, then it is sour”),
with conditionals in the plural (“If fruits are limes, then they
are sour”). A change between singular and plural formulation
should have no effect if reference to single instances is a
constitutive feature of the meaning of conditionals.
We found no evidence that the type of relation expressed in
the statement (lawful or coincidental) had an effect on peo-
ple’s answers. It may be that this variable is of no importance
for the task, yet before drawing this conclusion, it may be
worthwhile to see whether it has an effect when operational-
ized in a different way. Here it was operationalized through the
story context, which participants often mentioned not to have
read carefully after the first few trials. Future research could
reduce the length of the context stories to make the relevant
differences between story types more apparent, or could in-
troduce the difference between relation types in the statements
themselves, as in “All the squirrels ate the pistachios” versus
“All squirrels eat pistachios.”
Summary
The psychological meanings of “if” and “all” are not equiva-
lent. The interpretation of conditionals applied to sets is
instance-focused and in accordance with the Equation P(“if
p then q”) = P(q|p). Universally quantified statements are at
least sometimes interpreted in a set-focused way, such that
P(“all p are q”) is the probability that no single instance of p is
not q. People’s responses do not take into account the expo-
nential relation between probability and sample size implied
by a set-focused interpretation, an observation that could
reflect a tendency to combine probabilities in an additive
rather than a multiplicative way. There was no evidence that
a statement’s interpretation is affected by whether the relation
that it expresses is lawful or coincidental.
a) If                                                         b) All
Fig. 3 Frequency histograms of differences in probability estimates for small versus big sample sizes in Experiment 3, (a) for conditionals, and (b) for
universally quantified statements
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Appendix
Table 3 Summary of the context stories used the experiment, illustrating the variation of the type of relation expressed in the statements (general law vs.
coincidence)
General law Coincidence
1. There is a type of tree calledWiapri. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species forms hollow seed hulls, the remainder form full seed
hulls.
There is a type of tree called Wiapri, which normally forms full seed
hulls. However, a certain proportion of the 100 Wiapri trees in the
botanical garden were harvested, so that these now have hollow seed
hulls.
2. There is a type of plant called Zail. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species produces a scent similar to that of lemons, the
remainder produce a scent similar to that of fresh grass.
There is a type of plant called Zail, with a scent normally like fresh grass.
However, in the context of an art project a certain proportion of the
100 Zails in the botanical garden were sprayed with lemon scent.
3. There is a type of plant called Delmai. A certain proportion of the
instances of this species has a green stem, the remainder have a red
stem.
There is a type of plant called Delmai, which normally has a green stem.
However, in the context of an art project, a certain proportion of the
100 Delmais of the botanical garden were covered with autumn
leaves, so that these now have a red stem.
4. There is a type of fruit called Zypru-melon. A certain proportion of the
instances of this species is sweet, the remainder is sour.
There is a type of fruit called Zypru-melon, which is normally sour.
However, in the context of an art project, sugar water was injected into
a certain proportion of the 100 Zypru-melons in the botanical garden,
so that these are now sweet.
5. There is a type of plant called Sandia. A certain proportion of the
instances of this species produces the chemical substance Baidol in
high amounts, the remainder hardly produce any Baidol.
There is a type of plant called Sandia, which normally hardly contains
any amount of the chemical substance Baidol. However, a certain
proportion of the 100 Sandias in the botanical garden was treated with
Baidol as a fertilizer, so that these now contain high amounts of
Baidol.
6. There is a type of tree called Cassim. A certain proportion of the
instances of this species has one type of leaf, the remainder have two
types of leaf, one in the lower and another in the upper part of the tree.
There is a type of tree called Cassim, which normally has one type of
leaf. However, a certain proportion of the 100 Cassim in the botanical
garden were grafted, so that these now have two types of leaf.
7. There is a type of plant called Kiria. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species has a thorny stem, the remainder have a smooth stem.
There is a type of plant called Kiria, which normally has a thorny stem.
However, the thorns of a certain proportion of the 100 Kirias in the
botanical garden were cut off, so that these now have a smooth stem.
8. There is a type of tree called Nantic. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species has a smooth bark, the remainder have a flaking bark,
where some parts of the bark are missing at any given time.
There is a type of tree called Nantic, which normally has a smooth bark.
However, a certain proportion of the 100 Nantics in the botanical
garden had part of their bark stripped off to make paper.
9. There is a type of plant called Tipra. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species grows upwards, the remainder grows sidewise on the
ground.
There is a type of plant called Tipra, which normally grows sidewise on
the ground. However, a certain proportion of the 100 Tipras in the
botanical garden was lifted and put on scaffoldings, so that these now
grow upwards.
10. There is a type of plant called Petien-potato. A certain proportion of the
instances of this species forms deep roots, the remainder form shallow
roots.
There is a type of plant called Petien-potato, which normally forms deep
roots. However, a certain proportion of the 100 Petien-potatoes in the
botanical garden were put in pots, so that these now form shallow
roots.
11. There is a type of tree called Baite. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species has a resinous bark which protects it from mites, the
remainder have a dry bark.
There is a type of tree called Baite, which normally has a dry bark.
However, a certain proportion of the 100 Baites in the botanical
garden was brushed with a resinous substance to protect them from
mites.
12. There is a type of tree called Saibu. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species remains small, the remainder grow to become very tall.
There is a type of tree called Saibu, which normally grows to become
very tall. However, a certain proportion of the 100 Saibus in the
botanical garden were cut repeatedly to make Bonsai trees of them, so
that these now remain small.
13. There is a type of tree called Bajten. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species builds water containers as reserves around its roots, the
remainder builds roots that are in direct contact with the soil.
There is a type of tree called Bajten, whose roots are normally in direct
contact with the soil. However, small water containers were placed
around the roots of a certain proportion of the 100 Bajtens in the
botanical garden.
14. There is a type of plant called Walru. A certain proportion of the
instances of this species grows on trees, the remainder grow on the
ground.
There is a type of plant called Walru, which normally grows on the
ground. However, a certain proportion of the 100 Walru in the
botanical garden were put in pots hanging from trees.
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Table 3 (continued)
General law Coincidence
15. There is a type of tree called Enli. A certain proportion of the instances of
this species has a rounded silhouette, the remainder have a pointed
silhouette.
There is a type of plant called Enli, which normally has a rounded
silhouette. However, a certain proportion of the 100 Enlis in the
botanical garden were cut for decorative reasons, so that their
silhouette is now pointed.
16. There is a type of tree called Grapia. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species produces orange fruits, the remainder produce white
fruits.
There is a type of tree called Grapia, which normally produces white
fruits. However, in the context of an art project, a certain proportion of
the 100 Grapias in the botanical garden had its fruits painted orange.
17. There is a type of plant called Namgu. A certain proportion of the
instances of this species grows straight stems, the remainder grow
intertwined stems.
There is a type of plant called Namgu, which normally grows straight
stems. However, in the context of an art project, a certain proportion of
the 100 Namgus in the botanical garden had their stems intertwined.
18. There is a type of plant called Birnei. A certain proportion of the
instances of this species have a bark with black lines, the remainder
have a plain white bark.
There is a type of plant called Birnei, which normally has a plain white
bark. However, in the context of an art project, a certain proportion of
the 100 Birnei in the botanical garden was painted with black lines.
19. There is a type of plant calledMirie. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species has white flowers, the remainder have red flowers.
There is a type of plant called Mirie, which normally has white flowers.
However, in the context of an art project, a certain proportion of the
100 Mirie in the botanical garden were watered with red water, so that
now their flowers are red.
20. There is a type of plant called Liau. A certain proportion of the instances
of this species has flat leaves, the remainder has cup-shaped leaves
There is a type of plant called Liau, which normally has straight leaves.
However, in the context of an art project, a vertical paper border was
pasted on a certain proportion of the 100 Liaus in the botanical garden,
so that these now have cup-shaped leaves.
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